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Theory, Evidence, and Policy Implications
Kevin Lang and Shulamit Kahn
Boston University
In response to persistent unemployment, particularly in Europe,
there have been calls to reduce the length of the workweek in order to
share the available work more equally.  Implicitly, advocates of these
mandated hours reductions believe that the demand for hours of work
is inelastic and independent of the number of workers used to fill those
hours.  Therefore overall employment can be increased by reducing the
number of hours that each individual works, a policy often referred to
as work sharing.  The view that modern workers would actually like to
reduce their work hours adds to the attractiveness of this proposal.
Juliet Schor’s book The Overworked American proved enormously
popular.  Despite stinging criticism from academic economists, the
book appeals to professional women, many of whom are in dual-career
families and feel caught between the high demands of their jobs and
their families.
The Canadian “Report of the Advisory Group on Working Time
and the Distribution of Work” (1994) takes a more cautious approach.
It suggests that about half of sustained reductions in overtime eventu-
ally are translated into new jobs.  On the basis of this and other argu-
ments, it recommends reducing the legislated standard workweek to 40
hours in those provinces where the legislated standard exceeds 40.  In
addition, it recommends giving employees the right to refuse to work
more than 40 hours per week.  Finally, it recommends allowing a max-
imum of 100 hours of compensated overtime per year.  Additional
overtime would have to be offset by reduced hours at other times.  In
effect, it therefore recommends a legislated maximum average work-
week of 42 hours.  We note in passing that this would be the maximum
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time spent per week on a single job.  Many people hold more than one
job.  Such legislation would undoubtedly increase these numbers.
It is relatively easy for economists to dismiss both the calls for
mandated hours reductions and Schor’s book.  In a simple model of
hours determination, hours are set optimally.  Any interference with the
market must reduce welfare.  Indeed, it is trivial to produce examples
in which reducing the workweek actually reduces employment due to
decreased efficiency, suggesting that there even might not be an effi-
ciency/equity trade-off.
Nevertheless, there are deficiencies in this simple economic argu-
ment.  The models which are used implicitly or explicitly to show that
reducing the workweek need not increase employment and therefore
may not reduce unemployment are models in which the labor market
clears, employment is efficient and there is no unemployment.  Having
assumed away unemployment, it is difficult to see how we can evaluate
programs designed to reduce it.  Clearly, more economic analysis is
called for.
The recommendation that the workweek should be reduced con-
trasts with many workers’ perceptions that they are underemployed.
Most workers do not want to reduce work hours in return for a propor-
tionate pay reduction.  The overwhelming evidence from both the
United States and Canada is that far more workers would like to
increase their hours than would like to decrease them, although the
European evidence is more mixed.  Thus, where some see mandated
hours reductions lowering unemployment, others see it exacerbating
underemployment.
In this chapter, we do not claim to resolve the issue of whether
mandated hours reductions are a viable mechanism for reducing unem-
ployment; our goals are more modest.  We consider, both empirically
and theoretically, workers’ survey responses regarding how many
hours they would prefer to work at the same hourly rate compared to
how much they actually do work.  When preferred hours diverge from
actual hours, hours are constrained.
We have two objectives in examining hours constraints.  The first is
to assess whether hours constraints are indicative of some sort of prob-
lem in the labor market, particularly one of underemployment.  The
second is to use the information on hours constraints to further our
understanding of the functioning of the labor market and determination
of working hours.
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We conclude that in the United States and Canada, the direction of
hours constraints is clear: wanting to work additional hours is more
prevalent than wanting to work fewer hours.  The evidence is less clear
for Europe.  The most promising avenue for explaining hours con-
straints is the development of models of imperfect matching in the
labor market, possibly supplemented by issues associated with long-
term contracting.  We develop a simple example, a model of bilateral
search, where although most workers want to work fewer hours,
imposing a legally mandated shorter workweek could worsen unem-
ployment and reduce the well-being of workers.  Thus we urge caution
regarding proposals to promote work sharing by requiring a shorter
workweek—the data suggest that more people would prefer to work
more hours than fewer hours, and even if people preferred fewer hours,
we cannot identify welfare-improving regulation without understand-
ing why both hours constraints and unemployment exist.
THE EXTENT OF HOURS CONSTRAINTS
Survey research on whether people in the United States would like
to work more, fewer, or the same number of hours dates back to at least
1966.  Since then, five surveys have asked comparable questions
regarding desired work hours.1  Table 1 gives the results of these sur-
veys.  All five surveys reveal the same general tendency: more than 40
percent of respondents would like to change their hours of work.  Of
these, a clear majority want more work not less.  Differences in the
samples make it difficult to draw strong conclusions about trends. 
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) also monitored the
relation between desired and actual hours through 1987.  In the PSID,
workers were first asked whether more hours were available on any of
their jobs.  Those who could not have worked more were then asked if
they would have liked to work more.  Similarly, they were asked if they
could have worked less and, if not, whether they would have liked to
work less.  One weakness of the PSID is that some salaried workers
responded that they could have worked more but, in a subsequent ques-
tion, revealed that they would not have been paid for the work.  Never-
theless, these workers were not asked if they would have liked to have
worked more in return for more pay.
264 Lang and Kahn
Table 1 Selected Survey Results on U.S. Workers’ Desire to Work More, 
Fewer, or the Same Hours (%)
Despite this weakness, the PSID has the advantage of offering a
consistent time series.  Moreover, work by Ham (1982) and Altonji and
Paxson (1988) shows that the responses to the constraints questions
have predictive power for behavior.  In addition, Kahn and Lang (1992)
show that for wage earners, the PSID questions give results that are
similar to those obtained using the questions in the other surveys sum-
marized in Table 1.
Table 2 presents the fractions of PSID respondents who say they
would have liked to work more or fewer hours over the period 1968–
1987.  There may be some bias in time trends in these PSID figures.
Year More     Fewer Same
1966 34 10 56
1978 28 11 61
1985 28  8 65
1991 33  6 62
1995 26 14 55
SOURCE: 1966: George Katona and his associates, sample of household heads (Katona 
et al. 1971).  The exact question was, “Some people would like to work more hours a 
week, if they could be paid for it.  Others would prefer to work fewer hours per week 
even if they earned less.  How do you feel about this?”
1978: Conducted by Louis Harris Associates, sample of employed civilians, aged 17 
and over.  The question was, “If you had a choice, would you prefer to work the same 
number of hours and earn the same money, fewer hours at the same rate of pay and earn 
less money, or more hours at the same rate of pay and earn more money?”
1985: Current Population Survey supplement, sample of employed persons, aged 17 
and over (Shank 1986).  Question identical to the one above.
1991: International Social Survey Programme.  This survey asked, “Think of the 
number of hours you work and the money you earn in your main job, including regular 
overtime.  If you only had one of these three choices, which of the following would you 
prefer: work longer hours and earn more money; work the same number of hours and 
earn the same money; work fewer hours and earn less money?”  (Bell and Freeman 
1995).
1995: The Gallup Poll, sample of employed persons, aged 18 and over (USA Today,
April 10, 1995).  The exact question was, “If you could, which of the following 
situations would you choose: fewer hours on the job but less income, the same number 
of hours and income that you now have, or more hours on the job and more income?”
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The PSID, limited to household heads, follows families through time.
While break-off families are added to the sample, there is a risk that
part of observed time trends captures changes in household heads over
the life cycle.  Additionally, in the early years, the low-income popula-
tion was oversampled.  However, over time, regression toward the
mean in earnings has led to progressively less oversampling of the low-
income population.  If these two factors introduce a bias, it should push
us toward finding a reduction in the desire to work more, because our
work shows that older workers are less likely and poorer workers more
likely to want more work. 
Table 2 Desire for Different Work Hours (U.S.) 1968–1987 (%)
Men Women
Year Fewer More Fewer More
1968  6 14  3 13
1969  6 20  6 17
1970  3 20  5 20
1971  6 20  6 21
1972  6 20  6 19
1973  6 20  6 18
1974  5 20  6 24
1975  5 18  5 23
1976  5 20  4 24
1977  9 22  7 18
1978  4 24  7 18
1979  6 22  7 18
1980  5 21  6 20
1981  7 23  5 23
1982  6 26  6 25
1983  7 26  5 23
1984  8 22  6 23
1985  8 22  7 21
1986  6 26  6 21
1987  6 21  6 22
SOURCE: Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
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In fact, there is no clear trend in the data.  The 1968 numbers are
quite different from those of later years.  Ignoring this first year of the
survey generates a positive correlation between time and both wanting
to work more and wanting to work less for women.  For men, there is a
positive time trend for wanting to work more, but it is significant at
only the 0.1 level.
Despite the similarity of these responses to questions intended to
measure the same phenomenon, there are other ways of framing the
question that generate different answers.  A 1978 survey (Best 1981)
asked workers what the largest portion of their current yearly income
they would be willing to give up for shorter workdays (shorter work-
weeks, more vacation).  The options offered were designed to involve
proportional cuts in pay (e.g., “2 percent [1/50] of your income for 10
minutes off each workday), although given variation in the length of
the workday and number of days worked each year, these may not have
been exactly right.  Nevertheless, 23 percent said they would take a pay
cut for a shorter day, 26 percent for a shorter week, and 42 percent for
more vacation.  Note, however, that no similar question inquired about
possible increases in hours for additional income.
The Canadian Survey of Work Reduction (SWR), conducted in
1986, is particularly helpful for looking at the impact of question word-
ing.  While only 17.3 percent of Canadians responded that they would
take a pay cut in return for more time off, 26.7 percent were willing to
forego some or all of their anticipated pay increase for more time off.2
The Advisory Group on Working Time (1994) reports Beni-
madhu’s (1987) calculations from the SWR that 30.7 percent of Cana-
dian workers preferred fewer working hours while 32.1 percent
preferred longer working hours (p. 87).  The Advisory Group con-
cludes that “[t]he survey strikingly captures Canadians’ ‘indetermi-
nate’ mood regarding working time . . . .” (p. 25).
There are reasons for being skeptical about this conclusion. First,
the calculation of people preferring fewer hours included all workers
who answered either of the two questions positively (i.e., whether they
would be willing to take a pay cut for time off and whether they would
be willing to forego part of their pay increase for time off).  In contrast,
there was only a single question asking whether people preferred to
work more hours for more pay (see note 2).
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Second, many respondents give contradictory answers to these
three different survey questions about hours constraints.  In fact, only
12 percent of respondents answer all three questions in a manner con-
sistent with wanting reduced hours.3  Twenty-seven percent, more than
twice as many, answer all three questions in a manner consistent with
wanting additional work hours.
Third, respondents who “expressed an interest” in working less
were asked why they were interested in less work.  Almost half rated as
“very important” at least one of various responses that are inconsistent
with a true preference for less work: giving others a chance for work,
avoiding being laid off, starting a business, looking for other work, run-
ning an existing business, or working at a second job.  In fact, more
than one-quarter rated avoiding being laid off as a “very important”
reason for wanting to work less, and more than half rated this as at least
“somewhat important.”  We must therefore exercise extreme caution in
interpreting the SWR as revealing a desire for more leisure among a
large number of Canadians.
In a similar vein, people who respond that they would like more
work might actually want to cut hours at a second job but not work
additional total hours.  However, so few of these respondents work at a
second job that excluding them would not change our estimates of
wanting more work.
Given the difficulties of interpreting the responses to the questions
regarding the desire for less work, and given the fact that the survey
does not inquire why individuals respond that they want to work more,
we must be somewhat guarded in our assessment of the results of the
survey.  Nevertheless, it seems to us that the evidence suggests that
Canadians are far more likely to want to work additional hours than to
work fewer hours.
This view is reinforced by the results of the 1995 Survey of Work
Arrangements (Drolet and Morissette 1997), which asked, “At this job,
given the choice, would . . . , at his/her current wage rate, prefer to
work: 1) fewer hours for less pay, 2) more hours for more pay, 3) the
same hours for the same pay.”  The survey found that 27 percent of
Canadians preferred, at their current wage rate, more hours for more
pay, compared with only 6 percent who preferred fewer hours for less
pay.  These results are quite close to those obtained for similar ques-
tions in the United States.
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Similar questions have been asked in other countries.  Unfortu-
nately, the results of two major surveys, the first conducted by the
International Social Survey Program (ISSP) and the second by the
European Union, conflict quite sharply.  Table 3 gives the results of the
ISSP survey, conducted in 1989.  Respondents were asked, “If you had
a choice, would you prefer to work: 1) the same number of hours and
earn the same money, 2) fewer hours at the same rate of pay and earn
less money, or 3) more hours at the same rate of pay and earn more
money?”
In Table 3, the United States looks similar to other OECD coun-
tries.  It has a relatively high fraction of workers who want to work
more, but this proportion is not substantially higher than in Ireland and
Italy.  Similarly, relatively few people in the United States want to
work less, but that is true of most other OECD countries.  In every
country more people want to work more than less, although the differ-
ence is not large in Germany.
Table 4 gives responses to the European Union survey, also con-
ducted in 1989.  The survey asked, “Assuming that your hourly rate
remained unchanged, would you like to work less, as long, or longer?”
While this question does not appear to be significantly different from the
question used by the ISSP, the survey results are dramatically different.
A large minority of workers in all countries reply that they would like to
work less.  In all the European Union countries, the fraction wanting less
work is significantly higher than the fraction wanting more.
Table 3 Desire for Different Work Hours in Various Countries
Country More Fewer Same
Austria 23  8 68
Germany 14 10 76
Ireland 30  5 65
Italy 31  7 62
Netherlands 18 12 70
Northern Ireland 27 6 68
Norway 24  7 69
United Kingdom 24 8 68
United States 33  6 62
SOURCE: Bell and Freeman (1995).
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Table 4 Desire for Different Work Hours in European Union      
We note some other results in the European Union survey that
make the results in Table 4 even more surprising.  The survey also
asked part-time workers whether they would prefer full-time work;
results are given in the last column of Table 4.  In France, Italy, Portu-
gal, and Spain, more people are part-time and want full-time work than
say that they would prefer to work more.  While this is technically fea-
sible (e.g., if part-timers respond that they want full-time work because
full-time work is compensated at a higher hourly rate than part-time
work), the counterintuitive result is concerning.
Another surprising aspect of the European Union study is the dif-
ference between answers to the question about wanting more or fewer
hours of work at their present hourly rate and answers to a question
regarding willingness to trade pay raises for shorter hours.  The corre-
lation across countries of the percentage wanting fewer hours in the
two questions is only 0.05, although the average across countries is not
very dissimilar (34 percent versus 30 percent).  
Country  More  Less Same
 Part-time, want 
full-time
Belgium 7 28 43 2
Denmark 9 29 61 1
France 9 39 52 10
Germany 4 38 55 1
Greece 15 28 57 11
Ireland 11 18 65 –
Italy 8  39 50 16
Netherlands 8 31 56 2
Portugal 2 49 46 10
Spain 12 42 44 15
United Kingdom 12 33 50 2
SOURCE: Commission of the European Communities (1991, Tables 22, 23).
The first three columns give responses to the question, “Assuming that your hourly rate 
remained unchanged, would you like to work less, as long, or longer?”
The last column gives the percentage of all workers who are both part-time and answer 
“yes” in response to the question, “Would you rather have full-time employment?”
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While there is no formal contradiction among the different answers
to the different questions, we find these differences disturbing.  How-
ever, the high number of Europeans desiring shorter hours in the Euro-
pean Union survey seems corroborated by the British Household Panel
Survey (BHPS) of 1991, which asked, “Thinking about the hours you
work, assuming that you would earn the same amount per hour as at
present, would you prefer to: work fewer hours than you do now; work
more hours than you do now; or carry on working the same number of
hours?”  Among male employees age 21–64, 36 percent respond fewer,
7 percent more, and 56 percent the same (Stewart and Swaffield 1995).
These results are quite similar to the European Union survey.  We find
the face validity of the BHPS to be the greatest of the three surveys,
because it seems to make it clear that the hourly rate would be
unchanged.  The contradictions within the European Union survey and
between the European Union and ISSP surveys remain a matter of con-
cern.
Finally we note that older European surveys indicated that wanting
more work is more common than wanting less work.  Katona et al.
(1971) report the answers to the question, “Some people would like to
work more hours per week if they could be paid for it.  Others would
prefer to work fewer hours per week even if they earned less.  How do
you feel about this?”  In all four European countries surveyed (United
Kingdom, Germany, Netherlands, and France), wanting to work more
was substantially more common than wanting to work less.
In part because of the importance of phrasing, economists are
inclined to be skeptical of answers to hypothetical questions such as
those used in all of these survey questions on preferred hours.  Unfortu-
nately, there is only limited experience in North America with organi-
zations allowing workers to voluntarily reduce work effort in return for
a pay reduction.  Nevertheless, it does not support the finding that a
large fraction of the population would give up income for more vaca-
tion.  Best (1981) reports that Santa Clara County, California, faced
with severe budget cutbacks in 1976, offered workers the option of a 5,
10, or 20 percent pay reduction in return for an increase of 10.5, 21, or
42 days of vacation.  We note that, given the existence of holidays and
fixed fringe benefits, this is somewhat more favorable to workers than a
proportionate reduction in compensation.  Seventeen percent of work-
ers increased their vacation.  Best also reports that about 16 percent of
Hours Constraints 271
lawyers in the public defender’s office take a three-month sabbatical
each year in return for a 25 percent salary reduction.  Because interest
in less work is more common among higher earning workers in both
U.S. and Canadian surveys, these experiences do not suggest a large
latent demand for reduced work hours.
Perhaps the most extensive test was in New York state government,
which in 1984 adopted a system of voluntary reduction in work sched-
ules, or V-time.  This offered full-time employees the opportunity to
reduce their work schedules and salaries by 5–30 percent while
remaining in their career-path positions.  Leave time and pensions were
prorated.  Subject to their supervisors’ approval, employees could
reduce their workday or workweek on a regular basis, take time off
intermittently, or “bank” time for use at a later date.  The official pro-
gram guidelines did not specify any “acceptable reasons” for request-
ing V-time, nor did the application even ask for reasons.  V-time was
not a once-and-forever choice.  Workers could request a V-time
arrangement to last for as long or short a period as they wished.  Many
employees were eligible for V-time, including professional, scientific,
technical, managerial, and “confidential” employees.
From the perspective of trying to discover a latent demand for
reduced working hours, the program could hardly have been more
ideal.  Its extreme flexibility gave employees themselves the choice of
the timing and duration of cutbacks.  Nevertheless, very few people
actually requested V-time.  The number of participants never repre-
sented more than 2 percent of employees in the jobs covered by the
program.  The most common uses of V-time were for temporary mater-
nity and family leaves.  As of October 1993, there were only 588 V-
time participants, less than 1 percent of the eligible employees.
THEORIES OF HOURS CONSTRAINTS
There is relatively little information on the actual number of hours
that individuals wish to work.  Based on Kahn and Lang (1995), the
average Canadian would like to work 8 percent more hours, compara-
ble in magnitude to the loss in work time due to unemployment.
Understanding hours constraints is therefore potentially extremely
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important.  Below we summarize four primary theories in the literature
that may explain why workers are constrained to work more or less
than they desire.
Long-Term Contracting
Lazear (1979, 1981) has argued that long-term contracts lead to a
divergence between the wage and the value of marginal product
(VMP).  This leads to a conflict between the hours that would be cho-
sen by the worker and firm.  Workers will wish to work until the mar-
ginal value of leisure equals the wage.  Firms will want workers to
work until their value of marginal product for the last hour worked
equals the wage.  Efficiency requires that hours be set so that the mar-
ginal value of leisure equals the value of marginal product for the last
hour worked.  If the value of marginal product from an hour worked is
independent of hours worked, it follows that whenever the wage
exceeds VMP, workers will be constrained to work less than they want.
Conversely, when VMP exceeds the wage, workers will be constrained
to work more than they want.
Lazear develops his argument in the context of an agency model.
In this model, workers post a bond, in the form of a low starting wage,
that is later returned to senior workers in the form of wages that exceed
their VMP.  Thus, in the agency model, junior workers should be con-
strained to work more than they wish while senior workers should be
constrained to work less than they wish.
In contrast, in many specific-capital models (Becker 1975), work-
ers and firms invest jointly so that junior workers are paid more than
their VMP.  The firm recoups its investment by paying senior workers
less than their VMP.  Thus, in the specific-capital model, junior work-
ers are constrained to work less than they wish while senior workers
are constrained to work more.  Kahn and Lang (1992, 1995) discuss
hours constraints in the agency and specific-capital models more fully. 
Other long-term contracting models also imply hours constraints.
For example, in Harris and Holmstrom (1982), firms and workers are
uncertain about how productive the worker will turn out to be.  Firms
offer insurance contracts in which they promise not to reduce wages.
Information about productivity is revealed gradually to the market.
Workers who turn out to be unproductive end up being overpaid, while
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the wages of more productive workers are bid up.  As with other long-
term contracting models, this can be shown to imply hours constraints.
On average, low-seniority workers are paid less than their VMP,
because firms are collecting insurance premiums.  However, on aver-
age high-seniority workers are paid more than their VMP, because
firms have stopped collecting insurance premiums and are making
insurance payments to low-productivity workers.  Consequently, on
average more senior workers will be constrained to work less than they
wish.4  Thus, in both the Harris/Holmstrom and agency models, the
tendency to want additional hours rises with seniority.
Hedonic Models of the Wage/Hours Locus
For most people, going to work involves substantial fixed costs.
Regardless of how long the individual remains at work, she or he incurs
the cost of commuting.  Once at work, there may also be set-up costs—
for example, the time it takes to boot the computer.  Therefore, it is no
surprise that we observe few workers who are employed for extremely
short time periods, because workers would demand a high hourly wage
while firms would only be willing to offer a very low one.  At the other
end of the spectrum, workers who worked very long hours would suffer
from fatigue.  The workers would require high wages to compensate
them for working such long hours, but firms would be unwilling to pay
high wages to such workers because their productivity would be low.
More generally, if we were to plot the average hourly wage work-
ers would require to compensate them for different weekly hours of
work (i.e., their indifference curves in wage/work-hours space), we
would expect the indifference curves to be U-shaped with moderate
hours of work requiring less average hourly compensation than very
short or very long workweeks.  In contrast, if we were to plot the aver-
age hourly pay firms would be willing to pay for different weekly
hours of work (i.e., their iso-profit curves in wage/hours space), we
would expect them to be hump-shaped with moderate hours of work
more compatible with higher average hourly wages than either very
long or very short workweeks.
If all workers and all firms are identical and there is free entry,
equilibrium is at the point of tangency between the indifference curves
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and the zero-profit iso-profit curve.  This point is efficient.  Given the
options available, no worker or firm wants to change hours.  
When workers and firms are heterogeneous, the tangencies of the
indifference and iso-profit curves will trace out a hedonic wage/hours
locus.  Workers who want short hours will be matched with jobs in
which short hours are relatively advantageous to the firm.  The shape of
the wage/hours locus is largely indeterminate.  It may be linear, hump-
shaped, U-shaped, or wiggly.  Regardless of the shape, each firm offers
a job with the most profitable wage/hours combination given this locus.
Each worker chooses his or her most preferred job given the same
wage/hours locus.  Again, the equilibrium is efficient, and no worker or
firm wants to change hours.
The survey questions described in the previous section typically do
not ask workers whether they would prefer to move to a different spot
along the wage/hours locus.  Instead they ask if workers would like to
change hours if they could work at the same hourly rate.  Because
workers may not have the option of working a different number of
hours at the same hourly rate in the hedonic model, they may well pre-
fer to change hours if given this option.
In order to know whether workers will want more or fewer hours at
their usual hourly wage, we need to examine the relation between their
marginal wage and their average hourly wage.  Workers choose to work
up to the point at which the marginal wage is equal to their marginal
value of leisure. If the average wage exceeds the marginal wage, it will
therefore also exceed the marginal value of leisure, and they will desire
additional work at that wage.  On the other hand, if the marginal wage
exceeds the average wage, the average wage will be less than the mar-
ginal value of leisure, and workers will prefer to reduce their hours if
they can do so at their average hourly wage.
Whenever the average hourly wage is greater than the marginal
wage, the hourly wage will be declining with hours worked.  Con-
versely, if the average hourly wage is less than the marginal wage, the
hourly wage will increase with hours worked.  Therefore, the hedonic
model predicts that workers will want more hours if they are on an
increasing section of the wage/hours locus and fewer hours if they are
on a decreasing section.
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Models with Rigid Wages
Hours constraints may arise when workers and firms sign fixed-
wage contracts that allow firms to set hours.  While fixed-wage con-
tracts are commonly seen empirically, they lack a theoretical founda-
tion.  Although insurance-based models would seem the logical
theoretical underpinning for fixed-wage contracts, these models sug-
gest that salary, not wages, should be fixed.  Similarly, efficiency wage
models imply efficiently set wages rather than fixed ones.
Despite its theoretical deficiencies, a fixed-wage model is attractive
because it suggests that hours constraints can be viewed as a contin-
uum where hours fall as demand falls, and unemployment is but an
extreme.  Without a formal theoretical model, it is impossible to make
firm statements as to the predictions that follow from this view of hours
constraints.  Nevertheless, we would expect that in such a model, the
desire to work less would be positively correlated and the desire to
work more negatively correlated with measures of excess demand in
the labor market. 
Hours as a Screening Device
Rebitzer and Taylor (1996) develop an explanation of why there
might be a shortage of short-hour jobs in certain occupations.  The
motivation for their model is law associates.  Rebitzer and Taylor argue
that requiring long hours is a screening device for individuals with low
disutility of effort.  Because potential partners care about being part of
a firm with hard-working partners and because partner effort is difficult
to monitor, law firms benefit from requiring that associates work long
hours.  Provided that disutility of effort and disutility of hours on the
job are correlated, reducing hours may create an adverse selection
problem by attracting less hard-working individuals to the firm.
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EVIDENCE FOR AND AGAINST THE THEORIES
Long-Term Contracts
Kahn and Lang (1992, 1995) report that in both the PSID and the
Canadian SWR, wanting to work additional hours is negatively related
to seniority.  Table 5 presents some representative results from the
Canadian data.   Almost half the most junior workers want more work,
compared with roughly 20 percent of the most senior workers.  In con-
trast, only about 10 percent of the most junior workers but twice as
many senior workers want to work less.  The relation between seniority
and the constraints favors models such as firm-specific capital, in
which wages grow less rapidly than VMP.  On the other hand, at no
seniority level does the average worker want less work or does the
number of workers wanting less work exceed the number wanting
more.  This suggests that long-term contracting cannot be the sole
explanation for hours constraints.  If it were, the results would imply
that wages exceed VMP at all seniority levels which is inconsistent
with profit maximization.
The Hedonic Model
The distribution of actual hours appears to be responsive to desired
hours, suggesting that matching takes place in the labor market as pre-
dicted by a hedonic model.  Kahn and Lang (1995) report that in Can-
ada, usual hours worked increase by half an hour for every hour
increase in desired hours.  This is true both for individuals and for
mean usual and desired hours across provinces.  In the European Union
survey, among 11 countries, the fraction of workers wanting to work
more than 45 hours is correlated with the fraction actually working
more than 45 hours (r = 0.42) and even more so if we exclude Portugal
(r = 0.80).  The correlation between the fraction wanting to work less
than 20 hours and those working less than 20 hours is even greater (r =
0.94, including Portugal).
On the other hand, the matching seems to be only imperfect inas-
much as it improves over time.  In the Canadian results reported in the
first part of Table 5, the fraction of workers who do not want to change
their work hours rises from 43 percent among the lowest tenure group
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Table 5 Proportion of Workers Experiencing Binding Hours Constraints 
by Job Tenure and Short/Overtime (Canada)a
Job tenure 
(months) More work Less work
Satisfied
 with hours N
Number of 
hoursb
1–3       47.9                        9.2 42.9          740        5.45
4–6       46.5             11.3             42.2          360        5.30
7–9       41.5             12.2             46.3          200        4.66
10–12     41.9             17.9             40.2          259        4.00
13–24     36.6             15.9             47.4         660        3.24
25–36     35.8             18.0             46.5          435        3.28
37–48     37.5             16.9             45.5          446        3.18
49–60     35.0             18.9             46.0          472        2.98
61–120    34.9             17.7             47.4        1598        2.80
121–240   25.9             20.8             53.3        1500        1.60
> 240      22.0             20.2             57.9          574        1.21
Short/overtime
On short-time   37.4             27.0             35.6            97        4.60
Normal hours    33.4             17.3             49.3        6167        2.88
More than usual 39.1             16.9             44.1          980        3.17
All             34.2             17.3             48.5        7244        2.94
SOURCE: Kahn and Lang (1995).
a Based on the Survey of Work Reduction supplement to the Canadian Labour Force
Survey, June 1986.
b “Number of hours” is the average number of additional hours desired by members of
the group.  All observations are weighted by their sampling weight. 
to 58 percent among the highest tenure group.  This suggests that either
workers adjust their tastes over time or that dissatisfied workers leave
for jobs with hours requirements that conform better to their tastes.
Using the PSID, Altonji and Paxson (1988) find that U.S. workers’
responses regarding desired hours help predict whether workers will
subsequently shift to longer or shorter hour jobs.
Additional evidence suggesting only imperfect hedonic matching
is found in the fact that substantial fractions of part-time workers
would prefer full-time work, and vice versa.  One likely interpretation
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of these statements is that these people would prefer to be at a different
point along the wage/hours locus but cannot.  Thus, although the
hedonic model may give insight into how hours and wages are deter-
mined, the empirical evidence suggests that there is substantial mis-
matching.
To test the hedonic model more formally, Kahn and Lang (1996)
use the June 1986 Canadian SWR to estimate the wage/hours locus and
an hours-constraints equation simultaneously.  We test whether the pat-
tern of hours constraints conforms to the hours constraints that should
be generated by the wage/hours locus under the hedonic model.  A pure
hedonic model is easily rejected.  We do not find that workers wanting
more hours are in the downward-sloping part of the wage/hours locus
and those wanting fewer are in the upward-sloping part.  
However, when hours constraints are allowed to depend on senior-
ity (as in the firm-specific model) as well as on the slope of the wage/
hours locus (as in the hedonic model), the empirical model fits surpris-
ingly well.  Kahn and Lang (1996) plot the actual wage/hours locus
estimated from income and hours data and the wage/hours locus pre-
dicted on the basis of hours constraints and seniority.  The curves are
quite similar except in the region beyond 60 hours, and the poor fit in
this region is due to the fact that average weekly earnings actually fall
beyond 58 hours.  Excluding these long-hour workers, who tend to be
low-tenure workers in managerial or administrative positions who are
presumably investing in their career, the equality of the two equations
cannot be rejected. 
Thus, we cannot reject a model of hedonic matching combined
with long-term contracting due to firm-specific skills.5  This is some-
what surprising in light of the evidence of imperfect matching cited
above.  It is also difficult to reconcile the sharp spike in the distribution
of hours with the pure hedonic model.  To some extent, the failure to
reject the hedonic model must reflect relatively inefficient statistical
techniques forced on us by the imperfect data.
Models with Rigid Wages
Hours constraints are correlated only weakly if at all with mea-
sures of labor demand.  Because the Canadian data are cross-sectional,
we measure variation in labor demand two ways.  First, we utilize the
Hours Constraints 279
fact that workers who respond that they are on short-time (reduced
hours) will tend to be in firms and/or industries experiencing unusually
low demand, while workers who are working more than their usual
hours will tend to be in firms and/or industries experiencing unusually
high demand.  The bottom panel of Table 5 shows the hours constraints
for 1) workers working less than usual because of short-time,6 2) work-
ers working their normal hours, and 3) workers working more than
their usual hours.  The desire to work fewer hours is most common
among workers on short-time.  Similarly, the desire to work more
hours is most common among those working more than their usual
hours.  The results suggest that when the establishment faces low
demand, workers who want to work fewer hours take advantage of the
situation to reduce their hours.  Similarly, when the establishment
needs additional hours, workers who want more hours are able to
increase their hours.  Thus, hours constraints cannot be interpreted as
cyclical underemployment being imposed on unwilling workers.
We also capture labor demand from the cross-sectional Canadian
data through regional unemployment rates. Here, too, the relation is
weak. Among Canadian provinces, there is a positive relation between
average additional hours of work desired and the unemployment rate,
but it falls well short of conventional significance levels (Kahn and
Lang 1995).  Similarly, in the U.S. PSID data, controlling for other fac-
tors, the local unemployment rate is positively related to the desire for
more work, but the coefficient is generally insignificant (Kahn and
Lang 1992).
Using time-series data from the PSID in Table 2, there is some evi-
dence of a relation between the prevalence of hours constraints and the
national unemployment rate.  The proportions of both men and women
wanting to work more are each positively correlated with the civilian
unemployment rate for men age 20 and over, although this result is not
robust to including a time trend in the case of women.  On the other
hand, the proportion wanting to work less is not significantly related to
the unemployment rate, and the correlation is positive.  
Hours constraints, however, are related to recent personal unem-
ployment experience in both Canada and the United States, even con-
trolling for experience and seniority (Kahn and Lang 1992, 1995).  One
explanation for this result is that workers who obtained their jobs after
an unemployment spell are less well matched than those who “chose”
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new jobs and experienced no intervening unemployment.  A second
explanation could be that people tend to want long hours after an
unemployment spell because they have run down their assets, but that
mismatching makes it unlikely that they actually obtain these long
hours.
Hours as a Screening Device
The Rebitzer and Taylor (1996) screening model predicts only
overemployment, rather than both overemployment and underemploy-
ment.  It thus cannot explain the desire to work additional work hours
that is so common in the United States and Canada.  Rebitzer and Tay-
lor found their theory to have explanatory power for lawyers.  It may
apply as well to other similar occupations.  In both Canada and the
United States,  people who desire to work fewer hours tend to be
higher-earning workers, i.e., more educated, in more skilled occupa-
tions, etc.  (Kahn and Lang 1991; Drolet and Morissette 1997).  These
may indeed be the occupations where hours are a signal of effort.
HOURS CONSTRAINTS, THE DISTRIBUTION OF HOURS, 
AND UNEMPLOYMENT
In sum, it appears to us that hours constraints are best understood
in the context of a matching model in which wages do depend on hours
as in hedonic models, but in which the matching is imperfect.  (There
may also be long-term contracting.)  An imperfect matching model
would also allow us to evaluate hours policies in the context of a model
in which unemployment as well as vacancies can arise.  In this section,
we take some tentative steps toward analyzing the impact of mandated
hours reductions in the context of such a model.  The model we use is a
simple extension of the Butters (1977) equilibrium search model.  We
describe it only informally.
In labor market variants of the model (Hosios 1986; Lang 1991),
each firm decides simultaneously whether or not to make an offer to a
worker and, if so, what wage to offer.  Making an offer entails paying a
fixed cost.  Under certain circumstances this may be interpreted as the
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cost of renting a machine prior to trying to hire a worker.  The worker
chooses the firm that offers him or her the highest wage.  Because some
workers may get only one offer and others may get multiple offers, the
equilibrium involves a wage distribution.  Each firm recognizes that
offering a higher wage raises the probability of hiring the worker but
lowers profits conditional on getting the worker.  Because some work-
ers randomly fail to receive any offers, there is unemployment.  Simi-
larly, some firms’ offers are turned down, resulting in vacancies.
To take account of hours constraints, we extend the model in a sim-
ple way.  First, we assume that firms make tied wage/hours offers.  The
worker chooses the firm offering the highest utility level provided that
utility level exceeds some reservation utility level.  For simplicity, we
assume that the value of marginal product per hour v is independent of
hours worked and that the utility function is given by u = log(wh) + (T
– h)/β where wh is (labor) income, h is hours worked and (T – h) is lei-
sure.  This utility function has the property that desired work hours
equal β and are independent of the wage rate.
We note that the resulting equilibrium is very much a theoretical
counterpart to Dickens and Lundberg’s (1993) study of constrained
labor supply in that workers choose from a limited and stochastic num-
ber of wage/hours offers.  In contrast with that paper, we allow for
unemployment.6
The firm chooses w and h to maximize expected profits which are
given by
(1) E(π) = P(u) (v – w) h – d,
where u is the utility associated with the offer, P is the probability of
the offer being accepted, and d is the fixed cost of making an offer.  The
equilibrium is characterized by a distribution of wages and hours, and
of utilities with corresponding values of P.
It is relatively straightforward to prove the following:7
1) All firms offer hours in excess of β.  In other words, all workers
would respond that they would want to work less at their usual
hourly wage.
2) There is a distribution of hours and wages.  The hourly wage is
monotonically declining in hours.  In fact, wh is constant.
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If we were to observe the facts 1 and 2 without the perspective of
the model, the logic for mandating hours restrictions would seem com-
pelling.  The atheoretical perspective would be as follows.  Workers
want shorter hours.  If hours could be reduced but salaries maintained
(i.e., wh constant), this even suggests that firms are equally happy with
both situations.  Moreover, the quantity of labor demanded would rise,
thereby reducing unemployment.  Thus mandating a shorter workweek
to reduce unemployment would appear to be a “sure-fire winner.”
Unfortunately, within the context of the model, that policy assess-
ment turns out to be completely wrong.  Again, it can be shown [see
Appendix] that:
1)  mandating lower hours increases unemployment,
2) mandating lower hours decreases wages, and
3) mandating lower hours is welfare deteriorating in the sense of
Pareto.
 Thus, in contrast to the conclusion we might be tempted to draw,
mandated hours restrictions will not be desirable.  The Appendix works
out a numerical example that illustrates these results.
Our choice of utility function and production function were
designed to generate an equilibrium in which workers express a desire
to work fewer hours.  We chose this example because we believe that
this equilibrium would appear to provide a strong a priori case for
mandated hours restrictions when examined atheoretically.  It is easy to
choose utility and production functions such that workers desire to
work more hours at their usual hourly wage.
At the cost of some complexity, Lang and Majumdar (2000) extend
this model to allow for heterogeneous preferences and thus for imper-
fect matching.  Because each worker chooses from only a limited num-
ber of jobs, matching is imperfect.  Nevertheless, workers preferring
low-hours jobs tend to end up in jobs with low hours since they take
these jobs whenever a choice is available.  They find that hours restric-
tions can increase or decrease unemployment.  The principal welfare
effect is distributional.  Workers who prefer jobs with short hours are
better off while those who prefer longer hours are worse off.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR MANDATED HOURS RESTRICTIONS
Neither the empirical nor the theoretical case for mandating hours
restrictions to increase work sharing and reduce unemployment is com-
pelling.  In the United States and Canada, there is very little evidence
that workers are interested in accepting less pay in return for more lei-
sure.  The situation in Europe may be different.  
In the introduction to this chapter, we argued that we cannot evalu-
ate theoretically a policy designed to lower unemployment within the
context of a model which assumes away unemployment.  Neither the
long-term contracting nor the hedonic matching model predicts any
unemployment, while “models” of rigid wages have no theoretical
underpinnings with which to evaluate policy.  However, the imperfect
matching model sketched in the previous section predicts both hours
constraints and unemployment.  We have established that such models
do not justify casual support for mandated hours restrictions.  Indeed,
our simple model suggests that they may be welfare-deteriorating and
lead to wage losses and even more unemployment.  However, man-
dated hours restrictions may be welfare-improving in some situations
such as law firms where hours serve as a screening device.
Moreover, any attempt to legislate a reduced workweek and pro-
mote work-sharing will undoubtedly increase the pervasiveness of dual
job-holding, at least within the United States and Canada.  Whatever
theoretical model is assumed, there is also likely to be a change in the
wages paid for jobs with different levels of required hours.  Any analy-
sis of the effect of mandated hours restrictions must take these effects
into account.
Notes
We are grateful to Paul Beaudry, Randy Eberts, Thomas Lemieux, Mike McCracken,
Mark Stewart, the editors of this volume, and participants in the CIRANO summer
workshop on unemployment for helpful comments.  This project was funded in part by
NSF grant SBR-9515052.  The usual caveat applies.
1. We exclude proprietary surveys for which basic information on question wording
and sample design are not available and surveys with questions that do not explic-
itly suggest an earnings/hours trade-off.  A 1993 Gallup Poll asked workers their
actual and desired hours.  Mean actual hours were reported as 42.5 while desired
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hours were 36.7.  However, 16 percent of workers responded that they preferred
zero hours, suggesting that these respondents were not thinking of an hours/salary
trade-off.  Excluding this 16 percent of respondents, mean desired hours was 43.7.
2. The exact questions asked were
• “In the next two years, would you take a cut in pay if you received more time
off in return?”  Follow-up if no:  “Why not?”  Follow-up if yes:  “What percent
of your pay would you give up to have more time off?”  Accompanying these
questions was a table and examples to help the respondent think about how
much money an x percent pay cut represents, and how much time an x percent
hours cut represents.
• “Another way to gain more time off is to trade all or some part of your pay
increase.  Would you trade some of your increase in the next two years for
more time off?  For example, gain 5 percent more time off instead of a 5 per-
cent pay raise?”  Follow-up if yes:  “How much of your increase in the next
two years would you take as time off?”
The questionnaire proceeded with a set of questions on how the person would
prefer to reduce work time (e.g., fewer hours per day) and about reasons that per-
son preferred to work less.  The questionnaire then continued with:
• “If you continue to be paid at the same rate of pay that you are now, would you
work more hours for more pay?”  Follow-up if yes: “How many more hours
per week would you want to work?”
3. Many people gave inconsistent answers.  For instance, almost one-quarter of
those who said they were willing to take a pay cut for fewer hours also said they
were not willing to forego pay increases for fewer hours, and half of these actually
said they would like to work more hours for more pay.
4. Strictly speaking, only workers in the final work period have stopped paying
insurance premiums and only in this period are high productivity workers paid
exactly their marginal product.  In other years, they are underpaid because of
insurance premiums.
Allowing mobility reinforces the tendency for more senior workers on average
to be paid more than their marginal product and hence to prefer more work hours.
Workers revealed to be high productivity will be indifferent among all firms while
workers revealed to be overpaid will prefer employment at their present employer.
Consequently, highly productive workers are more likely to change jobs than are
overpaid workers, further adding to the average overpayment of senior workers. 
5. The fact noted earlier that seniority decreases the desire to work more hours is
also consistent with the firm-specific capital model.
6. Dickens and Lundberg (1993) is primarily an empirical paper, but it incorporates
a structural model.  Because their data set included only employed people, they
did not model unemployment.
7. Differentiate Eq. 1 with respect to both w and h.  Dividing one first-order condi-
tion by the other and rearranging terms gives w = βv/h.  Since firms can only make
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Consider a worker who obtained utility U0 in the unconstrained equilibrium.
The firm chooses the profit-maximizing combination of wage/hours for that
U0.  Let πa = (v – w)h – d be the profit obtained conditional on hiring a worker
achieving U0.  (Recall that the probability of the offer being accepted P is de-
pendent only on U.)  When hours are constrained, if the firm were still to hire
a worker who received U0, the new profit must be lower than the unconstrained
profit.
The zero profit condition requires that P (v – w)  = d.  Therefore, when hours
are constrained, πc ≤ πa implies that Pc(U0) ≥ Pa(U0).  For this to be true, the
likelihood of a worker obtaining utility greater than U0 must be lower (or equal)
when hours are constrained than when they are not.
Hence, workers are worse off (or, more formally, no better off) in the con-
strained equilibrium.  This argument applies to all utility levels, including the
reservation utility, the lowest utility offered.  If the likelihood that a worker
who is offered the reservation utility accepts the offer is greater in the con-
strained solution, then the likelihood of a worker receiving a utility greater than
this minimum reservation level is lower; so we will see higher unemployment
rates.
It may also be helpful to work through a numerical example.  Suppose that
β equals 40 (so that workers’ desired hours equal 40 as well), v equals 10, and
d equals 20.  We set the reservation utility so that in equilibrium the maximum
number of hours in any offer is 60.  The following can be derived: All workers
are offered an income of 400.  Hours offers range from 42 to 60; wage offers
range from 6.67 to 9.52.  The unemployment rate is 10 percent.  When hours
are set exogenously at 42, wage offers range from about 6.07 to about 9.52.
The unemployment rate is about 12 percent.  In a standard competitive model
with this same utility function and v = 10, a profit-maximizing firm sets hours
= 42.  Imposing the “competitive solution” dramatically lowers employment
and wages.
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